I am a little too rusty on this to be sure how much I agree off the bat, but initially I'm impressed! I'll keep checking each out and I expect it will be worth going back to the series when I next refresh my memory of Plato and Aristotle again.
One thing that stood out was the use of "activity" to translate ἐνέργεια. I think it is more common to translate this as "actuality" or "act". If ἐνέργεια just means "activity" in Greek, than I can see the reason for sticking with it. But does it? Aristotle is so often careful about not crossing Categories, or noting when something does, that it seems he would be the last person to call a substance (or even its principles, matter or form) an activity.
To be clear, I have not read the Metaphysics or Physics in Greek, and I do not have an specialty there. It just seemed like an unnatural and uncommon rendering to me, though I see that it is used that way in the quotations you gave from other authors.
Kosman's preface here gives good reasons for translating energeia as activity: energeia is not situated in modal reference to necessity and possibility, but in reference to *realizing a capacity*
Regarding the translation of energeia as activity, Michael is right to point to Kosman's book as a justification.
Kosman is certainly not alone here. I'd also direct you to the introduction to Joe Sachs' translation of the Metaphysics. I think that at this point Kosman and Sachs' interpretation is - if not universally - at least widely accepted.
Here's a snippet:
"The seeing that Aristotle calls on us to do demands that we come alive to the world in a way that can launch us toward philosophic questioning. No one can do it for us. But a thoughtless translation of the word that names what we are asked to see can deprive us of any chance to begin. In the usual translations energeia crumbles away to nothing as 'actuality.' Any hope of recapturing it through its near-synonym is lost, since these translations render entelecheia also as "actuality." Does this word give you any hint that Aristotle is responding to the call made to the philosopher by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist (249 C--D) to approach being by thinking rest and motion together? Does it convey a stable condition that can be achieved only by ceaseless activity? Does it describe a motion that leads nowhere but back into itself? The Latin word actualitas may have performed those services for a reader of Latin, but its English cognate means nothing that remotely suggests them. The idea of being-at-work pervades Aristotle's thinking. His characteristic vocabulary emphasizes it everywhere. He chooses a common noun (energeia) built on the root erg that signifies work. He finds the same meaning in the common verb echein that means to be by continuing or holding on in some way, and attaches it to an adjective (enteles) that signifies completeness, to form the coinage entelecheia, which redoubles its meaning by punning on a common word (endelecheia) that means continuity or persistence. He remakes Socrates's favorite question ti esti (what is it?) by changing the verb to the past tense (en), in which alone its progressive aspect can be made unambiguous. And he chooses for the primary explanatory word in his ethical writings the noun hexis made from echein, to signify an enduring state of character that is also an active condition. His language pulses with this dynamic conception of being, and guides a way of seeing the world as organizing itself into every instance of identity it presents. For the reader open to philosophy, these words of Aristotle are what Homer called 'winged words,' shafts that traverse the distance between people and lodge in the place where understanding is possible.
I’m going through the Preface and may end up having to go farther. I appreciate an author who can say, “I read Aristotle with a worshipful hermeneutic eye.”
I’m used to reading St. Thomas’ Latin for these words, and so it is easy to forget how perhaps inadequate the English based on them is for the typical English reader. I’m not convinced yet, though it works by analogy (form is to matter as activity is to capacity; that much seems true). Calling a substance or form an activity just sounds wrong to me still, but it will be helpful to see the various contexts in which he applies this.
I’m especially concerned about the Physics here. For example, in the definition of motion, you want actuality rather than activity, as that would seem to include motion in the definition. I’m sure he has to address these things, so I’ll wait until I read more of the book.
One more hesitation: In the Preface, he seems to speak positively of someone translating episteme as understanding rather than knowledge. Again, I’m formed by my reading of scholastics, but this just gets confusing, since understanding usually refers to a different intellectual habit, so then what is the word for that? Tradition needn’t be the final word on these things, but a benefit of consistency in language is greater ease in communicating with earlier voices.
Anyway, all that to say, I’ll have to keep reading. Thank you for sharing!
Very good article. I have long thought that the gulf between Plato and Aristotle was overstated, and that the latter was only refining the thought of the former with some slight modification.
I am a little too rusty on this to be sure how much I agree off the bat, but initially I'm impressed! I'll keep checking each out and I expect it will be worth going back to the series when I next refresh my memory of Plato and Aristotle again.
Another excellent and insightful post!
One thing that stood out was the use of "activity" to translate ἐνέργεια. I think it is more common to translate this as "actuality" or "act". If ἐνέργεια just means "activity" in Greek, than I can see the reason for sticking with it. But does it? Aristotle is so often careful about not crossing Categories, or noting when something does, that it seems he would be the last person to call a substance (or even its principles, matter or form) an activity.
To be clear, I have not read the Metaphysics or Physics in Greek, and I do not have an specialty there. It just seemed like an unnatural and uncommon rendering to me, though I see that it is used that way in the quotations you gave from other authors.
Kosman's preface here gives good reasons for translating energeia as activity: energeia is not situated in modal reference to necessity and possibility, but in reference to *realizing a capacity*
https://dn721909.ca.archive.org/0/items/aryeh-kosman-the-activity-of-being-an-essay-on-aristotles-ontology/Aryeh%20Kosman%20-%20The%20Activity%20of%20Being%20An%20Essay%20on%20Aristotles%20Ontology.pdf
Regarding the translation of energeia as activity, Michael is right to point to Kosman's book as a justification.
Kosman is certainly not alone here. I'd also direct you to the introduction to Joe Sachs' translation of the Metaphysics. I think that at this point Kosman and Sachs' interpretation is - if not universally - at least widely accepted.
Here's a snippet:
"The seeing that Aristotle calls on us to do demands that we come alive to the world in a way that can launch us toward philosophic questioning. No one can do it for us. But a thoughtless translation of the word that names what we are asked to see can deprive us of any chance to begin. In the usual translations energeia crumbles away to nothing as 'actuality.' Any hope of recapturing it through its near-synonym is lost, since these translations render entelecheia also as "actuality." Does this word give you any hint that Aristotle is responding to the call made to the philosopher by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist (249 C--D) to approach being by thinking rest and motion together? Does it convey a stable condition that can be achieved only by ceaseless activity? Does it describe a motion that leads nowhere but back into itself? The Latin word actualitas may have performed those services for a reader of Latin, but its English cognate means nothing that remotely suggests them. The idea of being-at-work pervades Aristotle's thinking. His characteristic vocabulary emphasizes it everywhere. He chooses a common noun (energeia) built on the root erg that signifies work. He finds the same meaning in the common verb echein that means to be by continuing or holding on in some way, and attaches it to an adjective (enteles) that signifies completeness, to form the coinage entelecheia, which redoubles its meaning by punning on a common word (endelecheia) that means continuity or persistence. He remakes Socrates's favorite question ti esti (what is it?) by changing the verb to the past tense (en), in which alone its progressive aspect can be made unambiguous. And he chooses for the primary explanatory word in his ethical writings the noun hexis made from echein, to signify an enduring state of character that is also an active condition. His language pulses with this dynamic conception of being, and guides a way of seeing the world as organizing itself into every instance of identity it presents. For the reader open to philosophy, these words of Aristotle are what Homer called 'winged words,' shafts that traverse the distance between people and lodge in the place where understanding is possible.
https://share.google/LyDel7LeV8Ne0cnUi
Not only Sachs and Kosman but the ever estimable Myles Burnyeat concurs as well!
I’m going through the Preface and may end up having to go farther. I appreciate an author who can say, “I read Aristotle with a worshipful hermeneutic eye.”
I’m used to reading St. Thomas’ Latin for these words, and so it is easy to forget how perhaps inadequate the English based on them is for the typical English reader. I’m not convinced yet, though it works by analogy (form is to matter as activity is to capacity; that much seems true). Calling a substance or form an activity just sounds wrong to me still, but it will be helpful to see the various contexts in which he applies this.
I’m especially concerned about the Physics here. For example, in the definition of motion, you want actuality rather than activity, as that would seem to include motion in the definition. I’m sure he has to address these things, so I’ll wait until I read more of the book.
One more hesitation: In the Preface, he seems to speak positively of someone translating episteme as understanding rather than knowledge. Again, I’m formed by my reading of scholastics, but this just gets confusing, since understanding usually refers to a different intellectual habit, so then what is the word for that? Tradition needn’t be the final word on these things, but a benefit of consistency in language is greater ease in communicating with earlier voices.
Anyway, all that to say, I’ll have to keep reading. Thank you for sharing!
Very good article. I have long thought that the gulf between Plato and Aristotle was overstated, and that the latter was only refining the thought of the former with some slight modification.