Great piece, Tim. Very much enjoyed reading this. Here is a broad question on the categories, and I guess also the originality of Kant's achievement, that I would love to hear your thoughts on at some point:
As I understand Kant's development of the twelve categories, he begins by adopting Aristotle's fourfold method of classifying judgments. Later, he rejects Aristotle's empirical derivation of the categories as being fundamentally a posteriori, rather than a priori. Aristotle's attention to everyday lifeforms, and the language we use to describe them, is of course not 'transcendental' in the way Kant thinks necessary to secure categorical judgments against the Humean skeptic.
However, Kant does say several times in his discussion of the categories that his primary purpose is much the same as Aristotle's, as concerns the desire to derive categories in the first place. The issue is that Aristotle's attempt is "rhapsodic" in that it does not derive according to a universal, governing principle. His empirical method is too everyday, haphazard, episodic, etc.
My question is this: do you think it would it have been possible for Kant to "derive" his twelve categories of the understanding without this dialectical engagement with Aristotle's empirical ontological method? I guess what I am trying to get at is whether or not Kant's achievement, as you see it, must contain Aristotle's original achievement within it in some sense, as Hegel will later claim. If it does, how does that temper the originality of Kant’s philosophical achievement? I’m curious as to whether or not you think Kant's "...objects must conform to our knowledge of them" is a decisive break with Aristotle's method of derivation that stands on its own or, as Hegel will insist, only half the story. Thanks again for this!!
Well, I’m not sure if I’m in a position to answer this but, here are a few things I do think:
I do think that Hegel is right to criticize Kant for the same thing Kant criticizes Aristotle for: a setting out of the categories which is "picked up” rather than truly derived.
This is an instance of Kant not fully following out the consequences of his principle of self-consciousness.
Nevertheless, elsewhere in his philosophy Kant did lay out the principle of self-consciousness in a way which gave it a more architectonic role than ever before. The fact that he is not everywhere consistent in this does not change this fact.
I think that it is not that Kant discovers self-consciousness, per se, but that it becomes more explicit and a fulcrum of thinking in a new way, especially once reformulated by the later idealists. This is because we are operating in the wake of Descartes and a broader historical movement in which human beings take themselves to be “substantial” enough to be a starting point (the turn to the subject).
Kant had to pick up the categories in this fashion because otherwise he would have had to change some of the major elements of his philosophy: he would have had to allow the “I” to be more than the empty, formal, act of combining, something that is productive of its own content. And he would have had to revise his understanding of judgments to include what Hegel calls their “speculative” character.
Nevertheless, there are parts of Aristotle that are speculative in a way that Kant does not perceive. Much that is pre-critical is implicitly transformative once it is made to pass through the crucible of the I. I’m not sure if the categories are one of them; I really don’t know. I know Rödl is not a fan of that work.
Excellent. I am reflecting upon two considerations in light of this lucid and thought-provoking investigation.
First, if "determining the content of a concept and determining the conditions of its use cannot be separated," is there ever an absolute or complete distinction between concept and judgment? In thinking a concept, I am necessarily thinking about its application, and its application necessarily occurs through judgments. Thus, in thinking about a concept, I am already thinking about the faculty of the power of judgment. (I am approaching this implicit containment of judgment within concept from a Hegelian standpoint in which determinate concepts yield judgments, and judgments yield syllogisms.)
Second, this framing of self-consciousness as a mode of awareness or recognition rather than a grasping of the self as an object seems inextricably linked to Kant's phenomenal/noumenal distinction. I know that you bracket Kant's infamous "thing-in-itself" from this inquiry; however, is this possible? Consider this passage about the transcendental unity of apperception from the B-edition of Kant's First Critique:
"Now since for the cognition of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception ... I ... have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself" (B157/B158).
Based on this excerpt, it appears that "self-consciousness" in the Kantian register of awareness/recognition relies upon the distinction between phenomenal appearance (self as it appears to itself) and noumenal reality (self as it is in itself).
I agree with your first point, I believe. I do think Kant thinks this as well as Hegel. Obviously how they understand the syllogism is different.
With the second, I don't think it is accurate to say that Kant's notion of self-consciousness "relies" on the phenomenal/noumenal distinction, but he certainly interprets the results in keeping with that distinction.
The passage you mention refers I believe to the fact that part of what is brought to the unity of apperception is our inner theater, our inner intuition of ourselves.
Kant is right to note that in unifying these inner experiences of ourselves, we do not know the "substance" of the soul in the pre-critical sense of say a Leibniz.
Any intuition of a substance of this sort, if it were really purely "given," could not be brought to self-consciousness.
But there's nothing preventing you from, as Hegel will (and will present grounds for the necessity of this via the internal breakdown of any attempt to hold otherwise), saying why assume that there is something behind these appearances, something we don't have access to?
To use a related discussion in Hegel, why not assume that the essence just is the law shining through the appearances?
In other words, I don't think that his characterization of self-consciousness includes any problematic phenomenal/noumenal distinction. It is his interpretation of what he has found that is the problem.
Great piece, Tim. Very much enjoyed reading this. Here is a broad question on the categories, and I guess also the originality of Kant's achievement, that I would love to hear your thoughts on at some point:
As I understand Kant's development of the twelve categories, he begins by adopting Aristotle's fourfold method of classifying judgments. Later, he rejects Aristotle's empirical derivation of the categories as being fundamentally a posteriori, rather than a priori. Aristotle's attention to everyday lifeforms, and the language we use to describe them, is of course not 'transcendental' in the way Kant thinks necessary to secure categorical judgments against the Humean skeptic.
However, Kant does say several times in his discussion of the categories that his primary purpose is much the same as Aristotle's, as concerns the desire to derive categories in the first place. The issue is that Aristotle's attempt is "rhapsodic" in that it does not derive according to a universal, governing principle. His empirical method is too everyday, haphazard, episodic, etc.
My question is this: do you think it would it have been possible for Kant to "derive" his twelve categories of the understanding without this dialectical engagement with Aristotle's empirical ontological method? I guess what I am trying to get at is whether or not Kant's achievement, as you see it, must contain Aristotle's original achievement within it in some sense, as Hegel will later claim. If it does, how does that temper the originality of Kant’s philosophical achievement? I’m curious as to whether or not you think Kant's "...objects must conform to our knowledge of them" is a decisive break with Aristotle's method of derivation that stands on its own or, as Hegel will insist, only half the story. Thanks again for this!!
Well, I’m not sure if I’m in a position to answer this but, here are a few things I do think:
I do think that Hegel is right to criticize Kant for the same thing Kant criticizes Aristotle for: a setting out of the categories which is "picked up” rather than truly derived.
This is an instance of Kant not fully following out the consequences of his principle of self-consciousness.
Nevertheless, elsewhere in his philosophy Kant did lay out the principle of self-consciousness in a way which gave it a more architectonic role than ever before. The fact that he is not everywhere consistent in this does not change this fact.
I think that it is not that Kant discovers self-consciousness, per se, but that it becomes more explicit and a fulcrum of thinking in a new way, especially once reformulated by the later idealists. This is because we are operating in the wake of Descartes and a broader historical movement in which human beings take themselves to be “substantial” enough to be a starting point (the turn to the subject).
Kant had to pick up the categories in this fashion because otherwise he would have had to change some of the major elements of his philosophy: he would have had to allow the “I” to be more than the empty, formal, act of combining, something that is productive of its own content. And he would have had to revise his understanding of judgments to include what Hegel calls their “speculative” character.
Nevertheless, there are parts of Aristotle that are speculative in a way that Kant does not perceive. Much that is pre-critical is implicitly transformative once it is made to pass through the crucible of the I. I’m not sure if the categories are one of them; I really don’t know. I know Rödl is not a fan of that work.
Excellent. I am reflecting upon two considerations in light of this lucid and thought-provoking investigation.
First, if "determining the content of a concept and determining the conditions of its use cannot be separated," is there ever an absolute or complete distinction between concept and judgment? In thinking a concept, I am necessarily thinking about its application, and its application necessarily occurs through judgments. Thus, in thinking about a concept, I am already thinking about the faculty of the power of judgment. (I am approaching this implicit containment of judgment within concept from a Hegelian standpoint in which determinate concepts yield judgments, and judgments yield syllogisms.)
Second, this framing of self-consciousness as a mode of awareness or recognition rather than a grasping of the self as an object seems inextricably linked to Kant's phenomenal/noumenal distinction. I know that you bracket Kant's infamous "thing-in-itself" from this inquiry; however, is this possible? Consider this passage about the transcendental unity of apperception from the B-edition of Kant's First Critique:
"Now since for the cognition of ourselves, in addition to the action of thinking that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception ... I ... have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself. The consciousness of oneself is therefore far from being a cognition of oneself" (B157/B158).
Based on this excerpt, it appears that "self-consciousness" in the Kantian register of awareness/recognition relies upon the distinction between phenomenal appearance (self as it appears to itself) and noumenal reality (self as it is in itself).
I agree with your first point, I believe. I do think Kant thinks this as well as Hegel. Obviously how they understand the syllogism is different.
With the second, I don't think it is accurate to say that Kant's notion of self-consciousness "relies" on the phenomenal/noumenal distinction, but he certainly interprets the results in keeping with that distinction.
The passage you mention refers I believe to the fact that part of what is brought to the unity of apperception is our inner theater, our inner intuition of ourselves.
Kant is right to note that in unifying these inner experiences of ourselves, we do not know the "substance" of the soul in the pre-critical sense of say a Leibniz.
Any intuition of a substance of this sort, if it were really purely "given," could not be brought to self-consciousness.
But there's nothing preventing you from, as Hegel will (and will present grounds for the necessity of this via the internal breakdown of any attempt to hold otherwise), saying why assume that there is something behind these appearances, something we don't have access to?
To use a related discussion in Hegel, why not assume that the essence just is the law shining through the appearances?
In other words, I don't think that his characterization of self-consciousness includes any problematic phenomenal/noumenal distinction. It is his interpretation of what he has found that is the problem.
oh gotta read this this looks good!